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FORMAL AND RATIONAL AUTHORITY
SOME NOTES, HYPOTHESES AND APPLICATIONS
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Talcott Parsons questioned the analytic precision of Max Weber's
legal-rational type of authority in bureaucratic organizations. It is
proposed that two separate types should be distinguished: rational
and legal (or formal) authority. The basis of legitimation for the
first is the effective utility of the person in authority, i.e. his
technical competence to perform. On the other hand, legal authority
is invested in an individual on the basis of a normative or legal
structure. Another difference between the owo rests on the premise
that formal authority derives from the organization, whereas rational
authority may find its source of legitimation outside the organiza-
tion. In the case of formal authority, the organization defines the
boundaries within which domination is exercised. For rational author-
ity, the power utilized depends on the capability of the individual
to accomplish effective action.
UtiliZing these two types of authority as dimensions, Dahren-
dorf's conflict model may be employed to predict the nature of the
relationships between two authority figures. A typology of authority
types may be derived.
Introduction
Max Weber's formulation of the three pure types of authority is probably the
most well developed and Widely accepted framework for conceptualizing the phenomenon
of authority in the social sciences. His legal-rational, or bureaucratic, type is
so widely used that it lies in the background of even popular conceptions of organi-
zational structures. Even so, the analytical "purity" or the legal-rational type of
authority has, for the most part, remained an un-asked (or tabu) question.
The first notable exception was Talcott Parsons in his introduction to Weber's
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1942) where Parsons makes a very
important observation concerning Weber's conception of bureaucratic authority. He
notes:
Weber's formulation of the characteristics of bureaucratic organi-
zation, which has become a classic, raises some serious analytical dif-
ficulties in the treatment of social structure. It is the present
writer's opinion that he /Weberl has thrown together two essentially
different types which, though often shading into each other, are analyt-
ically separate.
The problem may be approached by noting the importance Weber
attaches to technical competence (p. 335) as a basis of bureaucratic
efficiency, and his statements that bureaucratic administration is
'essentially control by means of knowledge' (p. 337).
Weber, however, started from the organization of authority within
a corporate group. The fundamental model he had in mind was that of
legal 'powers,' particularly powers of coercion in case of recalcitrance.
K•J . S. VI I, 4 135 Winter 1971
136 Kansas Journal of Sociology
The position of the exerciser of authority of this sort is legiti-
mized by his incumbency of a legally defined office. It is not
logically essential to it that its exerciser should have either
superior knowledge or superior skill as compared to those subject
to his orders ••• (l947:58-9, fn. 4).
The apparent mixture of two types of authority in Weber's formulation of the
bureaucratic form of organization (based on what Weber seems to consider one pure
type of authority) has, in recent years, begun to receive somewhat more attention.
Victor Thompson (1961), for example, although not mentioning Parsons' observation,
implicitly uses the idea as the underlying thesis of his entire book on organiza-
tion. Much recent thinking in organizational theory has focused on attempts to
formulate ideal types, man! based on the separation of authority types, within the
broader bureaucratic type.
Yet, little work seems to have been done toward explicitly developing ideas
about the two types of authority themselves, separate from the forms of organi~ation
in which they are found, or to which they might give rise. An attempt to separate
the two types of bureaucratic authority along the lines of Weber's original formula-
. tion and to begin to explore their consequences in authority relationships will be
the focus of the following discussion.
Two Authority Types from One
Weber's original typology of authority ultimately rests on differences in the
bases of the legitimation for the authority in each type. Thus, the legal-rational
type of authority found in the bureaucratic form of organization is thought of as
being legitimized on what Weber terms "rational grounds--resting on a belief in the
'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to author-
ity under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)" (1947:328).
Even though Weber calls them "rational grounds," the type of legi timation-base
he describes might more accurately be termed "legal," or "formal," leaving the term
"rational" free to be applied to the type we wish to distinguish from it.
"Rational" authority (as contrasted to the "formal" authority which Weber
describes) may be thought of as being based on rational grounds, that is, resting on
the belief in the effective utility of the actions and commands of the person in the
authority position for the area of organizational activity over which he has author-
ity. Rational authority, in other words, is based on a belief in the usable technical
competence of the authority holder, for entirely pragmatic reasons.
Now, by "technical competence" I do not mean to imply only professional training
of some sort. I do not mean to limit the role of rational authority to the sphere of
"staff vs. line" or highly trained specialists VB. officials. The technical compe-
tence involved in rational authority may be the result of on-the-job learning or
experience with an area of tasks, problems and solutions over time, as well as the
result of some special, directed training.
Neither should the idea of "technical competence" be limited to "technological"
as opposed to "administrative" types of tasks. Technical competence makes just as
much difference in the direction and coordination of the efforts of other people as
in the carrying out of some concrete technological task.
Finally, the application of the concept of technical competence should not be
limited to any particular range of either breadth or depth of effective knowledge or
skills.
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The important point in the idea of technical competence is that it must be some-
thing in which individuals can vary by virtue of learning and experience, and that it
is believed to make some significant difference in the effectiveness and/or efficiency
with which the individual carries out the tasks in his area of competence.
Although rational authority has been initially differentiated from formal autho-
rity in terms of the bases of legitimation, there is another crucial difference be-
tween them in the way in which they are legitimated, a difference which offers a sec-
ond means of separating them.
In the case of formal authority, the legitimation for an authority position comes
from the rules, the legal structure, governing the articulation and operation of the
organization. The source of the legitimation, then, is the organization itself, as a
whole. On the other hand, the source of the legitimation for rational authority, be-
cause of its very nature, can be relatively independent of the legal structure of the
organization, and, hence, independent of the organization in which it is found, at
least when considered as a whole.
The reason for this can best be understood if we go back to Weber's derivation 9f
the concept of authority. Authority is thought of as legitimated domination, and domi-
nation is defined as power exercised through commands. But what is the nature of the
power involved in each of the two types of authority?
If we think of power as a resource, for the case of fonmal authority, the power
on which it is based derives from the legal structure of the organization and is thus
controllable and alienable by the organization. It cannot, strictly speaking, exist
apart from the organizational, legal structure from which it stems.
However, the power available as a resource in the case of rational authority lies
in technical competence, the ability to accomplish something--recognizing problems, cat-
egorizing problems, arriving at possible effective solutions, et cetera--by applying
some knowledge, experience or skill. Opportunities to gain and develop technical com-
petence exist relatively independent of the organization and its legal structure. This
means that the power available to one in a position of rational authority, while possibly
gained through activity in an organization, can be, so to speak, personally appropri-
ated, and becomes, in the form of effective knowledge, immune from withdrawal by the
organization (although it can be rendered unusable through dismissal).
In addition, and perhaps even more important, is the fact that the pragmatic test
of competence which forms the basis upon which the legitimacy for rational authority is
ascribed can operate unaffected by the legal-formal aspects of the organization's struc-
ture, i.e., legitimacy can be granted to candidates for rational authority because what
they know or do is believed to work, almost entirely without regard for the rule struc-
ture of the organization. This tends to further contribute to the autonomy of the legi-
timacy for rational authority from legal-formal considerations.
Finally, completely unlike the legitimacy involved in formal authority, the legi-
timacy for rational authority, being relatively independent of the organizational
legal structure, can be granted by some social unit(s) other than the entire organi-
zation. For example, the source of the legitimacy for rational authority may be only
the individual's immediate superior (in the formal sense), one or more of his sUbor-
dinates, only the ultimate superior of the organization, only his fellow workers,
some entirely separate segment of the organization, some personal or group completely
outside the organization, or even, an idea which with some reservations can be said
to be part of the phenomenon of authority, the individual's own self-definition as
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supported by some organizationally-extraneous social influences.
In summary, the differences between formal and rational authority can be
charted as follows:
Basis of legitimacy
Grounds for legitimacy
Source of legitimacy
Nature of power
Source of power
Formal
Belief in "right" of
person to hold authority
Legal structure
Organization
Use of organizational
constraints granted to
person
Legal structure of
organization
Rational
Belief in effective utility
of person's actions and
commands
Pragmatic test (or outside
qualification)
Social units not necessar-
ily identical with whole
organization
Technical competence
resulting in effective
action, acquired by person
Opportunities for acquiring
knowledge and skills
Authority Types as Dimensions
The potential theoretical independence between formal and rational authority,
independence in the nature and source of the power involved and in the nature and
source,of the legitimacy for each type of authority, leads this writer to think that
here we are dealing with two independent dimensions of authority in bureaucratic
organizations. In the idea of dimensions of authority lies the potential importance
for theoretically separating formal and rational authority types.
As an example of the utility of thinking of authority types as dimensions, we
could apply the idea to Dahrendorf's model of conflict (1959). If we were to take
the liberty of limiting the area of application of his model to an organizational
context, instead of societies, and also limiting the units to individuals in authority-
relationships, instead of social categories of persons in similar positions, we could
recast Dahrendorf's model very toughly as follows: conflict arises (over questions
of legitimacy) between persons in differential positions of authority in authority-
relationships. But, in this form, the statement is only a general model. It lacks
necessary statements of the conditions under which it has a high probability. of being
true. Such a specification of conditions would contribute to testable theoretical
hypotheses. Thinking of authority as a dimension would allow one such statement of
conditions to be made. But, still the model seems to lack power.
However, consider the possibility of plugging in two dimensions of authority in
an authority-relationship. If we think of the dimensions as independent, i.e.,
graphically orthogonal, a cross-classification or typology is possible. Such a
typology offers a more precise specification of conditions under which the general
model may be expected to obtain.
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Graphically, the possible theoretical conditions of authority for one person on
the two dimensions may be represented as:
Fo~al
Hi Lo
Rational
Hi
Lo
1
3
2
4
This indicates that a person may be high in both fo~al and rational authority
(condition 1), or high in rational but low in fonnal authority (condition 2), or low
in rational but high in formal authority (condition 3), or, finally, low in both
rational and formal authority (condition 4).
Now, let us suppose a hypothetical social relationship between two persons, A
and B. Since each of them can have four possible conditions of authority on the two
dimensions, between them there are sixteen possible combinations of authority condi-
tions in their relationship. Each combination could be considered a condition for
their relationship.
What can now be hypothesized about the effects of these various possible com-
binations, or ccnditions for their relationship, in terms of the above general model
of conflict?
The combinations Al-BI, A2-B2, A3-B3, and A4-B4 result in ca~es of equality,
i.e., no authority differential on either dimension is involved. These cases would
be expected to exhibit no conflict at all (of the type relevant to the model), and
hence comprise the lower limiting cases for the model.
Case 1. If we found Al coupled with B2, a case where both individuals have
roughly equally high rational authority (assuming the rational authority to be based
on a similar degree of technical competence in the same area), but different ~ounts
of formal authority, such as in a hierarchically arranged team of specialists, we
might expect a middle-to-low degree of conflict to stem from their differential
autho~ity positions, because there is only one rather than two dimensions of authority
on which to differ in this case.
Case 2. If AI is paired with B3, we have a case where two persons are formally
equals, but one has more rational authority than the other, such as an old hand and
a new man on the same hierarchical level. As in the above case, middle-to-low levels
of conflict would be expected.
Case 3. If we examine Al and B4 as a condition where A has both high formal and
high rational authority while B has neither, such as a specialist placed over a func-
tionary, we have two dimensions on which the persons differ. Here is a case where
the idea of dimensions of authority becomes most important in predicting the level of
conflict. If we were to accept Dahrendorf's model at face value, we would have to
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say that, since the persons'positions differ on two dimensions of authority, the
level of conflict would be very high. But, if we remember that the dimensions can
vary independently, we can think of them as working either with or against each
other. For this reason, it is suggested that, in this case, the two dimensions are
working together and that little or no conflict would arise from these differential
authority positions.
Case 4. If, however, we consider A2 and B3, as a condition where A has high
rational authority but low formal authority, while B is just the opposite with low
rational and high formal authority, such as in a hierarchy of official over special-
ist, we have a case which, in terms of Dahrendorf's general model, is exactly like
that of case 3 above in that here again there are two dimensions on which the persons
differ. But, in terms of our evolving idea of the directions of the dimensions,
this case is the theoretical opposite of case 3, in that, instead of the values of
the dimensions varying together, they vary inversely. Therefore, we would not only
expect that the level of conflict would be high, in concordance with the expectation
derived from Dahrendorf's model, but also that it would be the condition under which
we would find the highest possible level of conflict to be expected within the range
of this model. This case, then, forms the upper limiting case for the model.
Case 5. The combination A2-B4 is much like case 2 except that both parties are
low in formal authority instead of being high, and like case 1 except that the dif-
ferences are in terms of rational instead of formal authority. Since only one-dimen-
sional differences are involved, a middle-to-1ow level of conflict would be expected.
Case 6. A3 and B4, as a condition where A has high formal but low rational
authority and B has low values on both dimensions, such as in a case of an official
over a functionary, since only one dimensional difference exists, should give rise
to only a middle-to-low incidence of conflict.
The remaining six possible combinations are merely the reversed conditions dis-
cussed in the first six cases. They would be the same, and result in the same levels
of conflict as their counterparts already discussed.
This example of the use of the notion of dimensions of authority as a way of
stating conditions and developing hypotheses allows us to raise (or even begs) some
important questions which can only be answered by empirical investigation. Is con-
flict in authority relations the result of merely differential authority positions,
as Dahrendorf' s model implies, regardless of the number of dimensions of authority
involved? Or, are different authority dimensions, possibly working together or at
cross-purposes between different authority positions, the more precise conditions for
this type of conflict? Or both?
If the technique of cross-classifying authority types as dimensions proves prom-
ising, further insights could be gained by including Weber's two other authority
types, charismatic and traditional, and the "missing" type, "ideological," proposed
by Willer (1967). The presentation of such a convoluted typology cannot be attempted
here, but its fonm and potential can easily be imagined.
Utility
As possible uses for such an elaborated typology, there is, of course, a more
detailed investigation into the association between the various authority-type com-
binations and the incidence of conflict, as has been stated in the above restructur-
ing of the Dahrendorf model. But, such a typology need not be limited to the study
of conflict. It seems possible, for instance, to meaningfully classify organizations
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or sub-parts of them by means of the combinations found, or by the priorities given
to the several dimensions in the structuring of authority relationships. This classi-
fication, then, could be used as either an independent or dependent variable in any
number of theoretical models and empirical studies.
Conclusion
This highly abbreviated discussion has hopefully made progress toward three
ends: to suggest the possibility of not one but two separable types of authority
intertwined in bureaucratically structured organizations; to demonstrate the fruit-
fulness of conceiving of authority as having independent dimensions; and, to suggest
areas of profitable investigation which could be tapped by using typologies based on
cross-classifications of such dimensions or authority.
Footnotes
lA lucid summary of, and important contribution to, these efforts is contained
in Davf.d Willer, "A Theory of Two Bureaucratic Types" (Unpublished manuscript, Uni-
versity of Kansas). The present paper is partially based on some suggestions made
by Professor Willer.
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